In claiming the legality of its actions, but twisting the law in subtle (and 23 not so subtle) ways, Russia is taking a card straight from America's 24 playbook. For most of the past 70 years, and certainly since the early 1990s,
25
the United States has been able to lead the international legal system, often 26 in cooperation with Europe. It defined the rules, the exceptions to those 27 rules and often the enforcement of those rules. 1 The present redistribution of 28 power in the international political system has brought an end to that 29 transatlantic moment in international law. 2 In place of the era of US legal hegemony and leadership, a multi-hub structure is emerging in which a 1 growing number of states can and do play issue-specific leadership roles in 2 a far more flexible and fluid legal system. 3 These states include, but are not 3 limited to, Brazil, Russia, India and China. In Crimea, Russia is, perhaps for 4 the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union, asserting itself as a renewed 5 hub for a particular interpretation of international law, one that in many 6 ways challenges the balance at the heart of the post-Second World-War 7 order and the ability of the US to lead that order. 
21
Moscow's legal argument that its support for, and ultimate annexation of,
22
Crimea is equally grounded in international law.
23
Russia's ability to exploit the legal ambiguities shared by Crimea and
24
Kosovo arises in large part because of the inherent tension between two oft-25 conflicting principles that have been at the heart of the international legal 
13
The relationship between these principles is critically at stake in Crimea. 
11
'citizens of the Russian Federation' in South Ossetia. 15 Russian legislation 12 and judicial interpretations confirm Moscow's view that the right of self-
13
defence includes the protection of its nationals abroad. 16 Russia has sought 14 to reinterpret these provisions, challenging existing interpretations in an 15 effort to establish an alternative framework for the use of force in its sphere 16 of influence. 17 Ultimately, Putin advances an international legal precedent that would 
16
Indicative of that leadership, Putin calls the US to task for its own past we must follow it whether we like it or not. 35 
26
There is little, if anything, that the US or Europe can do to turn back the 27 clock in Crimea. Russia has not only secured the territory as its own, it has 28 also set a precedent of lasting significance, one that is all the more important when borders can be redrawn over the heads of democratic leaders.' 36 
6
In so doing, the US has followed its traditional approach to international 7 law, which worked reasonably well in an era of US and European legal 8 hegemony: articulate and enforce your own preferred view of the rule in 9 question. In the new multi-hub structure of the international legal system, however, the US view -even if legally correct -will not control outcomes in 11 and of itself. Articulated unilaterally, it may even be counterproductive.
12
There will be a number of states that support Russia's advocacy of a more in Crimea, and, more importantly, some of the 58 that abstained and the 24 that were, perhaps intentionally, absent for the vote. 37 To the degree that would therefore be sufficient to make the sending state responsible. 38 In 12 other words, Russia would, most probably, be responsible for the actions of 
27
In determining the precedent that will be followed from events in Ibid., Paragraph 115.
